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NOTES
of an employee injured on the job may well be challenged in future con-
sortium actions.88
Texas prudently has sided with the majority of jurisdictions by allowing
both spouses an action for the negligent impairment of consortium. The
importance of this decision lies in the judicial recognition of the very real
injury to the marital relationship that may accompany a physical injury to
one spouse, as well as in the abandonment of the common law rule that
only acknowledged the husband's marital interests. After whittlesey, the
negligent injury of a married individual may give rise to two actions: the
impaired spouse may sue to recover losses incurred as a result of the injury
to his or her body, and the deprived spouse may bring an action for loss of
consortium to compensate for the impairment of his or her marital rela-
tionship. Texas courts will no longer predicate recovery for an impairment
of consortium on the gender of the injured spouse. Although the rejection
of the common law rule that denied the wife's recovery is by no means a
novel position, the Whittlesey court's refusal to rule by precedent alone
stands to its credit.
III. CONCLUSION
The recognition of the wife's action for negligent impairment of consor-
tium has been long overdue in Texas. The common law rule was perpetu-
ated by legal fictions and judicial inertia and reflected an anachronistic
view of the marital relationship. The few states that continue to deny the
wife recovery while recognizing the husband's action preserve a rule that
impugns the wife's emotional stake in her marriage and denies a remedy
for a real injury to a legally recognized interest.
Paul M Koning
Nervous Disabilities Induced by Repetitious Mental Trauma
Held Noncompensable: Transportation Insurance Co. v.
Maksyn
Joe Maksyn began working as a copy boy for the San Antonio Express
News in 1932 at the age of seventeen. Within the following fifteen years,
Maksyn's service to the newspaper earned him a series of six promotions.
88. The majority of states have interpreted their worker's compensation statutes to pre-
clude any action for loss of consortium arising out of an injury to an insured impaired
spouse. E.g., Nichols v. Benco Plastics, Inc., 225 Tenn. 234, 469 S.W.2d 135 (1971); Balcer v.
Leonard Refineries, Inc., 370 Mich. 531, 122 N.W.2d 805 (1963). See generally 2 A. LAR-
SON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 66, at 12-20 (1975); Comment, supra note
8, at 873; Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 900, 929-31 (1971).
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The final promotion placed Maksyn in a problem-solving position involv-
ing great pressure. Throughout his forty-three-year career with the news-
paper Maksyn worked fifty-five to sixty-five hours per week, often bringing
work home with him. Eventually the gradual build-up of stress overcame
him. Following an especially strenuous eighty-seven-hour work week,
Maksyn suffered a psychoneurotic reaction known as anxiety depression.'
The Industrial Accident Board awarded Maksyn thirty-six weeks of total
disability compensation, and Transportation Insurance Company, the em-
ployer's insurer, appealed this award to the district court in Bexar County.
Maksyn cross-acted and recovered on a jury verdict for total and perma-
nent incapacity.2 The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that Maksyn
had suffered a compensable occupational disease.' Transportation Insur-
ance Company obtained a writ of error from the Texas Supreme Court.
Held, reversed: repetitious mental traumatic activities cannot produce a
compensable occupational disease under the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Act. Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.
1979).
I. MENTALLY INDUCED NERVOUS INJURY AND THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPENSATION CATEGORIES UNDER TEXAS LAW
The issue of compensation for employees who sustain nervous or mental
injury has arisen recently in several jurisdictions.4 In the absence of com-
prehensive social legislation providing medical care and disability benefits
for incapacities of every description, the workers' compensation system is
often the only mechanism available to absorb the economic burden cre-
ated by disabled workers.' As the relationship between job-related psy-
chological stress and a significant variety of diseases becomes increasingly
pronounced,6 courts must assess whether, and to what extent, employees
1. Anxiety depression is a subclassification of the broader class of psychoneuroses col-
lectively termed anxiety reactions. All anxiety reactions are characterized by a diffuse and
constant anxiety. Associated symptoms of anxiety reaction include inability to concentrate,
irritability, and depression. Individuals whose neuroses are termed "anxiety depressions"
frequently become severely depressed and harbor suicidal feelings in addition to the other
symptoms. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation A wardsfor Psychoneurotic Reactions,
70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1131 (1961). See also S. ASCH, MENTAL DISABILITY IN CIVIL PRACTICE
§§ 2.19-.27 (1973).
2. The jury's findings pursuant to the special issues submitted appear at note 55 infra.
3. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 567 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1978).
4. For a survey of those jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of compensation for
workers suffering from nervous injuries induced by psychological trauma, see lB A. LAR-
SON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7-624 to -642 (1979).
5. See Manson, Workmen's Compensation and the Disabling Neurosis, II BUFFALO L.
REV. 376, 387 (1961).
6. The relationship between stress and disease has only recently begun to receive the
close scrutiny it deserves. Medical experts, researchers, and psychologists have begun to
direct their combined expertise toward a better understanding of stress as a serious health
hazard. The results of this research undoubtedly will arouse intense interest among person-
nel directors and compensation experts, as well as among insurance companies whose scope
of liability is likely to be affected. An informative article of particular, but not exclusive,
interest to women is Washington, The Special Health Hazards for Women at Work with an
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disabled as a consequence of psychological stress should be compensated.7
Judicial assessment of the proper extent of compensation for nervous
injuries is confounded by claimants' difficulties in establishing causation.
Although problems of proof are common among claims of mental disabil-
ity in general,8 the quantum of proof required to establish causation in
workers' compensation litigation may be even greater. Workers' compen-
sation statutes, designed as remedial alternatives to common law tort re-
covery, are not based on fault;9 thus, such defenses as contributory
negligence and assumption of risk are unavailable to the employer.' Lia-
bility automatically attaches to the compensation carrier upon a satisfac-
tory showing that the employee's disability proximately resulted "out of
and in the course of employment."" The closer scrutiny applied to claim-
ants' proof of the causal relationship in workers' compensation cases in
which the injury is psychosomatic in origin or effect results from some
courts' apprehension that workers' compensation may function as general
health insurance if not judicially monitored.' 2
In Texas, difficulties associated with compensation for psychoneurotic
disabilities are recurrent, due in part to the evolution of distinct compensa-
tion categories under Texas law. In its original form, the Texas Workers'
Emphasis on Stress, 14 FORUM 503, 508-14 (1979). See also H. SELYE, STRESS IN HEALTH
AND DISEASE (1976).
7. See generally Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23
VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1261-75 (1970).
8. One commentator has stated:
The conduct of a trial raising issues of mental or emotional disability
presents more problems of proof than do most civil or criminal cases. The
attorney must be prepared to present proof relating to the disability, as well as
proof on the substantive issue. . . . The evidence relating to the mental disa-
bility will probably raise more difficult problems of proof than the basic sub-
stance of the case being tried. This is because of the inherent complexity and
more tenuous nature of the psychiatric evidence ....
S. ASCH, supra note 1, § 10.1.
9. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 1130.
10. Professor Arthur Larson has stated:
The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: Was there a
work-connected injury? Negligence, and, for the most part, fault, are not in
issue and cannot affect the result ....
. . . [T]he test is not the relation of an individual's personal quality (fault)
to an event, but the relationship of an event to an employment. The essence of
applying the test is not a matter of assessing blame, but of marking out bound-
aries.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 2.10 (1978).
11. Many legislatures have selected the phrase "arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment" for workers' compensation statutes to denote that the employee must establish a
sufficient causal connection between his job and his disability. Proof of the causal relation-
ship is dependent upon a showing that the working environment created or enhanced the
risk of the resulting incapacity. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(9) (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1021 (1971); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978-
1979).
12. See, e.g., Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Biber, 146
S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.). See also
Shope v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972); Messex v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 293 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 1974).
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Compensation Act 13 covered only accidental injuries and such diseases or
infections as naturally resulted therefrom. Job-related illnesses that were
not precipitated by an isolated event or accident went wholly uncompen-
sated until 1947, when the Act was amended to include an exclusive sched-
ule of compensable occupational diseases. 14 Thereafter, the worker whose
disability could be traced to a specific time, place, and cause in the course
of employment styled his claim as an accidental injury. 5 Alternatively,
the worker whose disability developed gradually over the term of employ-
ment sought compensation for occupational disease,' 6 provided that his
particular illness appeared among those enumerated in the amendment.
Work-related infirmities that were neither enumerated nor capable of
identification by specific time, place, and cause remained noncompensa-
ble. 1
7
Although the exclusive list of occupational diseases evinced legislative
recognition that industry creates an increased risk of illnesses as well as
accidents,' 8 mentally-induced nervous illnesses were not included in this
list.' 9 It is therefore not surprising that the leading Texas case involving
compensable neurosis induced by mental trauma arose on an accidental
injury, rather than an occupational disease, cause of action. In Bailey v.
13. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 103, § 1, at 291.
14. A representative sample of compensable occupational diseases as enumerated by
the 1947 amendment to Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 20 includes: poisoning by
assorted chemical solutions, gases, and acids; anthrax caused by handling infected animal
hides; blisters; dermatitis; asbestosis; silicosis; radiation disease. See 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws,
ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-80.
15. See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. McKay, 146 Tex. 569, 573-74, 210 S.W.2d
147, 150 (1948); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Villasana, 558 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ); Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d
832, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Olson v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 447 S.W.2d 859, 859 (Tex. 1972); Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408
S.W.2d 140, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. Occupational diseases are cumulative disabilities that developed in the ordinary
course of employment. Their inception is traceable to the usual risks of employment, rather
than to an unanticipated event arising in the course of employment. See, e.g., Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968,
writ ref d n.r.e.) (poisoning from work with insecticides); Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas.
Co., 368 S.W.2d 955, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ refd n.r.e.) (anxiety from de-
tailed secretarial work); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17, 19
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ refd) (lung damage from exterminating work);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cowan, 271 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ refd n.r.e.) (skin damage from painting). Whether a disease is occupational must
be determined by the peculiar characteristics of each employment situation, the type of work
in which the employee is engaged, and the effect it has upon the individual. The crucial
issue for judicial determination is the type or quality of risk that employment must create in
order to satisfy the minimum requirement of legal causation. The various approaches that
have been taken to the basic risk issue are discussed in Levin, Legal Questions Regarding the
Causation of Occupational Diseases, 26 LAB. LAW. J. 88, 93-95 (1975).
17. For example, in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433 S.W.2d 534,
536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.), the claimant sustained permanent dam-
age to his heart and liver as a result of continued use of insecticides in the course of his
employment. He was denied compensation because his disease was neither traceable to a
specific event nor listed on the schedule of occupational diseases.
18. See Comment, The Compensability of Mentally Induced Occupational Diseases
Under Texas Workers' Compensation Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 148, 150 (1978).
19. See note 14 supra.
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American GeneralInsurance Co. ,20 decided by the Texas Supreme Court in
1955, a structural steel worker witnessed a coworker fall to his death when
the scaffold upon which both men had been standing suddenly collapsed.
Bailey, who managed to jump to a nearby building, sustained no physical
injuries of any consequence. Nevertheless, he did develop an anxiety reac-
tion that manifested itself through total paralysis when he stood at great
heights. Since structural steel work is often done at great heights, the neu-
rosis rendered Bailey incapable of performing his job.2 The supreme
court decided in favor of Bailey and removed the requirement of physical
impact22 as a prerequisite to compensation for nervous disability. The
court stated:
"[H]arm" to the physical structure of the body embraces. . . impair-
ment of use or control of physical structures, directly caused by the
accident. This interference with use or control in an organism whose
good health depends upon unified action and balanced synthesis can
be productive of the same disabling signs and symptoms as direct
physical injury to the cells, tissues, organs or organ systems.23
The Bailey court could have justified withholding compensation simply by
subscribing to a plain meaning interpretation of the statutory definition of
injury24 or by staunch adherence to the physical impact rule.25 The court
sought, however, to further the essentially remedial purpose of workers'
compensation law by construing the phrase "physical structure of the
body" to include the entire living and functioning human being and not
simply the skeletal structure. 26  By "rejecting the dichotomy between
20. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
21. See id. at 432-33, 279 S.W.2d at 316.
22. The "physical impact" rule originally functioned as a barrier to tort recovery for
psychoneurotic reactions by precluding recovery unless the illness was the proximate result
of some physical impact upon the body. See, e.g., Houston Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95,
194 S.W.2d 549 (1946); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (1894);
Michels v. Boruta, 122 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, no writ). This rule was
somehow integrated into workers' compensation law, despite the fact that workers' compen-
sation statutes were created to circumvent obstacles to recovery common to suits in tort. See
Manson, supra note 5, at 377, where the author states:
The impact of old methods of analysis is hard to avoid in any area of intellec-
tual endeavor. It was almost inevitable that certain ways of thinking about a
tort case of negligence would creep into the new scheme of workmen's com-
pensation. . . .The early cases under workmen's compensation exhibited the
tendency when they required that an injury could not be compensated unless
it resulted from a physical impact to the body.
...The problem of causality was more readily solved if the court could
point to a physical impact, which occurred at work, and the injury appeared in
the place of impact.
(footnotes omitted).
23. 154 Tex. at 436-37, 279 S.W.2d at 319.
24. The statute defines injury as "damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body." See 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, § 1, at 176.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. 154 Tex. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318. Professor Larson, whose treatise describes the
Bailey opinion as "one of the most impressive of the earlier decisions on 'nervous' injury,"
commented:
What makes the Bailey case especially noteworthy is the fact that the award
1979] NOTES
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'mind' and 'body' ",27 the Bailey court intentionally superimposed its own
definition of injury upon the more restrictive definition provided by the
legislature. The court clearly was conscious of the fact that a literal appli-
cation of the statute's language would deprive an incapacitated employee
of compensation in contravention of the law's very purpose.28
The Bailey court also was influenced to some extent by the ascertain-
able, accidental quality of the mental shock that precipitated the neuro-
sis.29 The injury undisputably had arisen in the course of employment as
the result of an unanticipated risk. Significantly, Bailey did not expressly
limit its holding to cases involving accidental injury;3" yet, all subsequent
decisions following Bailey have involved mental injuries precipitated by
an isolated stressful event.3 Cumulative disabilities accruing over the
course of employment remained within the narrow confines of the 1947
statutory schedule for another sixteen years.32
In 1971 the Sixty-second Legislature, for the express purpose of making
all diseases arising out of employment compensable,33 amended the Texas
was made under a statute defining "injury" as "damage or harm to the physi-
cal structure of the body."
The opinion is valuable. . . for its well-reasoned, up-to-date analysis of the
real nature of injury.
IB A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 42.23, at 7-631 to -632 (1979).
27. 154 Tex. at 438, 279 S.W.2d at 319.
28. The Bailey court articulated the reasoning behind its expanded concept of injury:
The substance of all of the testimony shows agreement that plaintiff's body
no longer functions properly. Now, can we say that, as a matter of law, even
though a "physical structure" no longer functions properly, it has suffered no
"harm"? What meaning can the word "harm" to the body have if not that, as
a result of the event or condition in question, the body has ceased to function
properly?
Id. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318-19 (emphasis added).
29. One authority has insisted that the accidental, sudden quality of the cause of Bai-
ley's neurosis was a crucial factor in the court's decision to award compensation. Sartwelle,
Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 183, 187 (1975).
30. That the issue resolved by the Bailey decision arose in the context of accidental
injury does not necessarily mean that the court intended to preclude application of the hold-
ing in cases of cumulative injury. The court was primarily concerned with establishing a
theory of compensation for workers suffering from psychologically induced, rather than
physiologically induced, mental incapacity; therefore, it did not focus upon the noncumula-
tive nature of the psychological trauma.
31. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mental ailment bordering on psychosis following a robbery at store
where claimant was employed); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employee suffered stroke after being severely chastised by
customer).
32. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d
140, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ retd n.r.e.); Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas.
Co., 368 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ refd n.r.e.).
33. The Texas House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary described the
amendment's purpose: "[T]he present system of listing occupational diseases for which com-
pensation will be given is outdated and inflexible in an age when new and varied employ-
ment gives rise to many additional employee health hazards . . . . [A] better approach
would be to make all diseases arising out of employment compensable .. " HousE JUDI-
CIARY CoMM., 62D LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS, REPORT ON S.B. 265, at 4 (1971).
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Workers' Compensation Act by repealing the exclusive list of occupational
diseases and replacing it with a broad definition of the term "occupational
disease."34 This seemingly radical shift in the legislature's conception of
occupational disease raised questions as to the continued viability of dis-
tinct compensation categories." The legislature's revised posture suggests
that neurosis induced by cumulative mental trauma might be compensable
as an occupational disease. Prior to the 1971 amendment, all recognized
occupational diseases were induced physically;36 mentally induced inca-
pacities had been compensated only when traceable to a specific time,
place, and cause.3 7 The elimination of the schedule of physically induced
diseases and the addition of the comprehensive definition of occupational
disease as "any disease arising out of and in the course of employment"38
have suggested to at least one commentator that mentally induced occupa-
tional diseases are eligible for compensation under the 1971 amendment.39
In light of the perceived purposes of workers' compensation,4" the broad
scope of the new definition of occupational disease, and the Sixty-second
Legislature's avowed intention to make all diseases arising in the course of
employment compensable, this construction is reasonable.
34. See generally Comment, supra note 18, at 151. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) provides:
Wherever the terms "Injury" or "Personal Injury" are used ... such terms
shall be construed to mean damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body and such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom. The terms
"Injury" and "Personal Injury" shall also be construed to mean and include
"Occupational Diseases".... Whenever the term "Occupational Disease" is
used. . . such term shall be construed to mean any disease arising out of and
in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body and such other diseases or infections as naturally result
therefrom. An "Occupational Disease" shall also include damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitious physi-
cal traumatic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the
course of employment. . . .Ordinary diseases of life . . . shall not be com-
pensable, except where such diseases follow as an incident to an "Occupa-
tional Disease' or "Injury" ....
35. For example, in Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.), the court awarded compensation under
amended § 20 and stated: "[Ijt is no longer necessary to allege and prove either an event
traceable to a definite time, place, and cause or a listed compensable occupational disease."
At least one writer has construed this statement to mean that distinct compensation catego-
ries are impracticable under § 20, while others consider the continued recognition of distinct
categories to be crucial to the amendment. Compare Terry, Occupational Disease and Cumu-
lative lnjury, 8 TRIAL L.F., Apr.-June 1974, at 3 with Sartwelle, supra note 29, at 184 and
Comment, supra note 18, at 154.
36. See 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-80. See also note 14 supra.
37. See note 31 supra.
38. See note 34 supra.
39. See Terry, supra note 35, at 3.
40. Professor Larson states:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the
wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain
form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries
which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case
... ,and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate
source of payment, the consumer of the product.
I A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 5 (1978).
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The majority of commentators, however, vigorously oppose the conten-
tion that the 1971 amendment recognizes the compensability of illnesses
induced by cumulative stress and related psychological stimuli.4" Noting
that amended section 20 provides that occupational disease "shall also in-
clude damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as
the result of repetitious physical traumatic activities,",4 2 these authors con-
clude that the amendment extended coverage only to those diseases that,
although gradually induced by physical trauma, had been overlooked by
the 1947 list.43 Supporters of this interpretation draw attention to other
sections of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act that, in their view, re-
veal a legislative intent to preserve the dichotomy between single-event
and cumulatively-caused disabilities.44 Ultimately, however, these advo-
cates rely most heavily upon the problems of proving causation.45
The basic premise of the argument advanced by those favoring a restric-
tive reading of amended section 20 is that the Bailey decision still limits
the scope of compensation for nervous injuries, notwithstanding the 1971
statutory amendment.46 Accordingly, these commentators argue that
mental injuries induced by mental trauma must continue to meet the strict
elemental burden of proof required for accidental injuries.47 Advocates of
this view derive support from the fact that a majority of jurisdictions have
allowed recovery only where the injury was precipitated by a specific
event,48 as in Bailey. A number of progressive jurisdictions, however,
award compensation for cumulative mental trauma.49
41. See, e.g., Sartwelle, supra note 29, at 187; Symposium-Workmen's Compensation.'A
Pandect of the Texas Law, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 668, 669-71 (1974); Comment, supra note 18, at
155; ef. Brill & Glass, Workmen's Compensationfor Psychiatric Disorders, 193 J.A.M.A. 354,
348 (1965) (espousing general proposition that providing benefits for most stress-induced
psychiatric disorders would extend workers' compensation beyond its intended scope).
42. See note 34 supra.
43. See Sartwelle, supra note 29, at 184-87; Comment, supra note 18, at 154.
44. One commentator has asserted, for instance, that the 62d Legislature's failure to
repeal § 22 of art. 8306 clearly indicates a legislative intent to encourage preservation of
separate compensation categories. See Sartwelle, supra note 29, at 186. Section 22 provides
that an occupational disease must be the sole producing cause of disability in order for an
employee to recover full benefits; if a preexisting injury contributes to the disability, com-
pensation is reduced accordingly. There is no corresponding provision for accidental injury.
In light of the amended language of § 20 to the effect that "[t]he terms 'Injury' and 'Personal
Injury' shall also be construed to mean . . . 'Occupational Diseases,'" it is difficult to con-
clude, on the basis of a different section of the Act passed many years before, that amended
§ 20 was itself designed to perpetuate a categorical dichotomy that had led to arbitrary deni-
als of compensation. See note 17 supra.
45. See Comment, supra note 18, at 158.
46. Sartwelle, supra note 29, at 187; Comment, supra note 18, at 153.
47. Sartwelle, supra note 29, at 187; Comment, supra note 18, at 153.
48. See IB A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 42.23, at 7-624 to -626 (1979).
49. California, Hawaii, Michigan, and Wisconsin have rejected the contention that an
isolated event is necessary in cases of nervous disability in order to ensure that the disability
is work-related, and accordingly each state allows compensation for neuroses induced by
cumulative mental trauma. In California, Hawaii, and Wisconsin the trier of fact assesses
the probative value of claimants' evidence of a causal connection between employment and
nervous injury. See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d
852, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971) (compensable "cardiac neurosis" induced by cumulative
stresses and anxieties of fireman's employment); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & In-
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For several years following the enactment of amended section 20, Texas
appellate courts rendered infrequent interpretations of the new occupa-
tional disease amendment. Those occupational disease cases that did ob-
tain appellate review under amended section 20 involved varieties of
cumulative physical trauma only.5" The Texas Supreme Court had yet to
confront directly the question of whether cumulative mental traumatic ex-
periences can result in compensable occupational diseases under amended
section 20.
II. TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE Co. v. MAKSYN
The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error-in order to address
Maksyn's workers' compensation claim for nervous disability induced by
the gradual accumulation of psychological stress. A unanimous court de-
cided that amended section 20 affords coverage for injuries induced by
repetitious physical, but not repetitious mental, traumatic activities.5
Aligning itself with the position advanced by the majority of commenta-
tors on the amended statute's scope,52 the court held that mentally induced
nervous illnesses are compensable only as accidental injuries, and as such
require proof of a specific time, place, and cause.
53
Following a detailed recapitulation of the stressful period preceding
Maksyn's anxiety depression, 54 the court found abundant evidence that
mental stimuli had caused Maksyn's condition, but found no evidence
from which the jury could have determined that any physical traumatic
activity had produced it.55 The court was thus called upon to decide for
dus. Relations Bd., 53 Hawaii 32, 487 P.2d 278 (197 1) (trainer's mental breakdown induced
by cumulative job anxieties and thus compensable); Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1974) (nervous break-
down precipitated by mounting pressures of purchasing agent's employment held compensa-
ble). In Michigan the employee's subjective perception of the degree of stress in his working
environment is paramount. See Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106
N.W.2d 105 (1960) (production line worker's neurosis compensable even though stresses of
employment were not objectively unusual under the circumstances).
50. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 516 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1974)
(chronic myositis from working in stooped position); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 537
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ) (repetitious pressing of knee against
lever); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (inhalation of toxic substances throughout 20 years of employ-
ment).
51. 580 S.W.2d at 334.
52. See note 41 supra.
53. 580 S.W.2d at 338.
54. Id. at 335. A capsulized version of the facts appears in the text accompanying note
I supra.
55. At trial, in response to the special issues submitted, the jury found: (1) that Maksyn
had or had had an occupational disease as a result of repetitious physical traumatic activi-
ties; (2) that the occupational disease had arisen out of and in the course of employment; (3)
that the occupational disease was a producing cause of Maksyn's total incapacity which
commenced on Sept. 4, 1974; and (4) that the duration of the incapacity was perAanent.
The court of civil appeals, affirming Maksyn's award, found that his disability had resulted
from a combination of mental and physical activities, including nerve-wracking pressure,
long working hours, and physical exhaustion. 567 S.W.2d at 851. In its brief to the supreme
court, the insurance company raised as error the lower court's holding that there was legally
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the first time whether mental injury induced by cumulative mental trauma
was sufficient to bring a claimant within the definition of occupational dis-
ease. Resolution of this question required a sentence-by-sentence analysis
of amended section 20.
Observing that the first sentence of section 20, which defines "injury" as
"damage or harm to the physical structure of the body," had not been
amended since 1947,56 the court concluded that case law that had devel-
oped under that sentence remained intact.5 7 Cases that had construed "in-
jury" to mean the direct consequence of a traceable accident were cited by
the court,58 including Bailey and its innovative interpretation of "physical
structure of the body."59 Maksyn relied on Bailey to establish his right to
compensation, while the insurance company attempted to distinguish the
cumulative causation of Maksyn's disability from the isolated causal event
found in Bailey.6" Although Bailey's extension of compensation to men-
tally induced neurosis was upheld, the court adopted the narrower inter-
pretation urged by the insurer,6 ' viewing the existence of a single
ascertainable causal event as crucial to the Bailey decision.62 Specifically,
Bailey was read to have equated "mental" with "physical" for the purpose
of the result, but not the cause, of an injury.63 Thus, the Bailey decision,
which had been considered one of the strongest cases supporting Maksyn's
contention in the court below,6 4 afforded no basis for the compensation of
repetitious mental trauma culminating in neurosis.
The court's reconciliation of the Maksyn case with Bailey is dependent
upon the continued recognition of distinct compensation categories. Jus-
tice Pope identified two sources supporting the viability of distinct catego-
ries: legislative intent to preserve the effect of prior decisions, as embodied
sufficient evidence of repetitious physical traumatic activities to support the jury's finding.
Brief for Appellant at 6. Evidence relating to the date of the disability's onset was also
raised as error on the basis of insufficiency, but the supreme court's disposition of the first
point of error in favor of the insurance company mooted that issue.
56. See 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, § 1, at 176.
57. 580 S.W.2d at 336.
58. See cases cited at note 15 supra.
59. 580 S.W.2d at 336; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
60. Briefs of counsel for both appellee and appellant focused heavily on the Bailey
opinion and the proper extent of its application, because § 5 of the 1971 amendatory act
states that "nothing contained in this Act shall ever be deemed to limit or expand recovery in
cases of mental trauma accompanied by physical trauma." 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 834,
§ 5, at 2541; Brief for Appellant at 12 and Brief for Appellee at 4. Thus, if Bailey were
construed to include claims for cumulative mental trauma, denial of benefits to Maksyn
would constitute a proscribed limitation on recovery. Conversely, if Bailey were construed
to limit its application to accidental injury claims, an award to Maksyn would be a pro-
scribed expansion.
The court's reliance upon § 5's caveat when characterizing Maksyn's award as a pro-
scribed expansion of recovery is somewhat paradoxical, however, in view of the court's ini-
tial finding that Maksyn's mental trauma was not accompanied by physically traumatic
activities. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
61. 580 S.W.2d at 336-37.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 337.




in section 5 of the 1971 Act,65 and the use of both "Injury" and "Occupa-
tional Disease" in the second sentence of amended section 20.66 The third
sentence,67 defining occupational disease as any harmful disease arising
out of employment, was accorded only a cursory examination, notwith-
standing its comprehensive implications.68
The Maksyn case was resolved primarily by the court's construction of
the fourth sentence of section 20,69 which provides that occupational dis-
ease shall also include harm to the physical structure of the body as a
result of repetitious physical traumatic activities. Maksyn's contention that
the amendment contemplated recovery for repetitious mental, as well as
physical, trauma was rejected following an examination of the amend-
ment's legislative history.7° The fact that Senate Bill 265 had originally
contained the phrase "repetitious mental or physical activities, ' 7 but as
enacted read "repetitious physical traumatic activities,"72 convinced the
court that the legislature intended to preclude recovery for cumulative
mental injury.73
In an effort to justify the court's denial of occupational disease status to
all cumulative mental injuries, Justice Pope presumed that the legislature
had drafted section 20 in recognition of the problems of proof that the
court envisioned any alternative holding would present.74 The court of
appeals' interpretation, which construed section 20 not to mean that there
can never be recovery for a cumulative mental injury or illness but rather
that the claimant must produce sufficient evidence probative of the causal
connection, 75 was ignored entirely. Instead of formulating a construction
65. See note 60 supra.
66. 580 S.W.2d at 337. No explanation is given as to how the court concluded that this
sentencepreserves distinct categories, save that the sentence is "transitional."
67. See note 34 supra.
68. 580 S.W.2d at 337. The only reason given by the court for not discussing this seem-
ingly pervasive sentence of the amendment in greater detail was that the phrase "physical
structure of the body" had already been mentioned in relation to Bailey. The fact that the
sentence also defines occupational disease as any disease arising out of and in the course of
employment should have triggered greater analysis. If the court was in fact under the im-
pression, as it appears to have been, that by the phrase "any disease" the legislature actually
meant only particular classifications of disease, it might have profitably elaborated on the
reasoning underlying such a reading.
69. See note 34 supra.
70. 580 S.W.2d at 337-38.
71. TEX. S.J. 666 (1971).
72. Id. at 5378; see note 34 supra.
73. 580 S.W.2d at 338. "The legislature chose to include coverage for physical activities
that cause the harm or damage; it excluded coverage for mental activities. The deletion of a
provision in a pending bill discloses the legislative intent to reject the proposal." Id.
74. d. The court injected its own concerns into its interpretation of the legislature's
intent: "The legislature very well reasoned that physical activities are identifiable and trace-
able whereas such factors as worry, anxiety, tension, pressure, and overwork are not. In the
case of mental activities, there must be the more reliable proof of an ascertainable time,
place, and event." Id.
75. 567 S.W.2d at 849. In response to the insurance company's admonitions regarding
problems of proving cumulative mental trauma as a cause of nervous disability, the court of
civil appeals stated:
We see very little justification for a holding that a claimant can recover for a
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designed to strike a practicable balance between competing considerations,
the supreme court read the amendment narrowly,76 in sharp contrast to the
purposeful statutory reading rendered by the Bailey court.
In holding that cumulative mental trauma cannot produce a compensa-
ble occupational disease, the Maksyn decision functions to deprive a sig-
nificant class of insured claimants of the opportunity to prove that their
nervous injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. The
supreme court seemed motivated primarily by its apprehension that cumu-
lative psychological stresses and anxieties are often less susceptible to exact
proof than cumulative physical traumatic activities. Nevertheless, the
complex etiology of some gradually induced nervous disorders should not
in and of itself form an impenetrable barrier to recovery for all such
claims.
77
The court's desire to discourage the expenditure of judicial time and
resources on frivolous or tenuous claims is readily understood in light of
crowded court dockets and the need to limit benefits to disabilities precipi-
tated by the employment environment. The blanket exclusion of all claims
of cumulative mental trauma from the occupational disease category, how-
ever, is an abdication of judicial responsibility to those claimants who can
prove the requisite causal connection between job stress and their nervous
disabilities. The sufficiency of evidence probative of the causal relation-
ship is a question that might be more appropriately resolved by triers of
fact on a case-by-case basis. 78 This approach, which has already been
adopted by a number of states,79 would serve to ferret out unfounded
claims while providing compensation to those capable of establishing the
causal relationship.
neurosis occasioned by one traumatic experience, but cannot recover for a
similar neurosis caused by a number of such traumatic experiences.
Plaintiff argues that to permit recovery by defendant would open a "Pan-
dora's Box" and employers would be subject to fraudulent and frivolous
claims. This same contention has been made in the past to numerous types of
negligence actions where recovery is now allowed, and we do not consider
such argument as controlling, as a claim must be supported by sufficient proof
to convince the trier of facts.
Id.
76. 580 S.W.2d at 337-38.
77. In light of the overwhelming amount of evidence probative of the causal relation-
ship between Maksyn's employment and his work and the dearth of evidence tending to
show that external causes had contributed to the disability, it appears that the Maksyn case
was decided on the basis of potential fact situations rather than on the basis of the fact
situation at bar. Certainly some claimants might seek recovery without adequate probative
evidence, but such criticism could scarcely be made of Maksyn himself, who had devoted
essentially every waking hour to his job.
78. For instance, the Maksyn case has already been cited as controlling in a case involv-
ing a claim for nervous disability allegedly induced by claimant's supervisor repeatedly ad-
dressing her in a "gruff tone of voice." University of Texas Sys. v. Schieffer, No. 12,826, slip
op. at 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, Apr. 11, 1979). It is difficult to believe that such a claim
would not have been dismissed on its own facts had the Maksyn court left intact the court of
civil appeals' reading of the amendment.
79. See note 49 supra.
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